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JAN ASSMANN 
1. Memory: Individual, Social, and Cultural 
Memory is the faculty that enables us to form an awareness of selfhood 
(identity), both on the personal and on the collective level. Identity, in its 
turn, is related to time. A human self is a "diachronic identity," built "of 
the stuff of time" (Luckmann). This synthesis of time and identity is ef­
fectuated by memory. For time, identity, and memory we may distinguish 
among three levels: 
Level Time Identity Memory 
inner (neuro­
mental) 
inner, 
subjective 
time 
inner self individual 
memory 
social social time social self, 
person as 
carrier of 
social roles 
communicative 
memory 
cultural historical, 
mythical, 
cultural time 
cultural 
identity 
cultural 
memory 
Figure 1 
O n the inner level, memory is a matter of our neuro­mental system. This is 
our personal memory, the only form of memory that had been recognized 
as such until the 1920s. O n the social level, memory is a matter of commu­
nication and social interaction. It was the great achievement of the French 
sociologist Maurice Halbwachs to show that our memory depends, like 
consciousness in general, on socialization and communication, and that 
memory can be analyzed as a function of our social life (Les cadres sociaux; 
La memoire collective). Memory enables us to live in groups and 
communities, and living in groups and communities enables us to build a 
memory. During these same years, psychoanalysts such as Sigmund Freud 
and Carl Gustav Jung were developing theories of collective memory but 
still adhered to the first, the inner and personal level, looking for collective 
memory not in the dynamics of social life but in the unconscious depths 
of the human psyche (see also Straub, this volume). 
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Aby Warburg, however, the art historian, coined the term "social 
memory" with regard to the third, the cultural level; he seems to have been 
the first one who treated images, that is, cultural objectivations, as carriers 
of memory. His main project was to study the "afterlife" (Nachleben) of 
classical antiquity in Western culture and he termed this project "Mnemo­
syne," the ancient Greek term for memory and the mother of the nine 
Muses. As an art historian, Warburg specialized in what he called 
Bildgeddchtnis (iconic memory), but the general approach to reception his­
tory as a form of (cultural) memory could be applied to every other do­
main of symbolic forms as well (Gombrich). This is what Thomas Mann 
endeavored to do in his four Joseph novels, which appeared between 1933 
and 1943 and which may rank as the most advanced attempt to recon­
struct a specific cultural memory—in this case of people living in Palestine 
and Egypt in the Late Bronze Age—and, at the same time, to conjure up 
our European cultural memory and its Jewish foundations in times of 
anti­Semitism (J. Assmann, Thomas Mann). Neither Warburg nor Thomas 
Mann, however, used the term "cultural memory"; this concept has been 
explicitly developed only during the last twenty years. It is, therefore, only 
since then that the connection between time, identity, and memory in their 
three dimensions of the personal, the social, and the cultural has become 
more and more evident. 
The term "communicative memory" was introduced in order to de­
lineate the difference between Halbwachs's concept of "collective mem­
ory" and our understanding of "cultural memory" (A. Assmann). Cultural 
memory is a form of collective memory, in the sense that it is shared by a 
number of people and that it conveys to these people a collective, that is, 
cultural, identity. Halbwachs, however, the inventor of the term "collec­
tive memory," was careful to keep his concept of collective memory apart 
from the realm of traditions, transmissions, and transferences which we 
propose to subsume under the term "cultural memory." We preserve 
Halbwachs's distinction by breaking up his concept of collective memory 
into "communicative" and "cultural memory," but we insist on including 
the cultural sphere, which he excluded, in the study of memory. We are, 
therefore, not arguing for replacing his idea of "collective memory" with 
"cultural memory"; rather, we distinguish between both forms as two 
different modi memorandi, ways of remembering. 
2. Culture as Memory 
Cultural memory is a kind of institution. It is exteriorized, objectified, and 
stored away in symbolic forms that, unlike the sounds of words or the 
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sight of gestures, are stable and situation-transcendent: They may be trans­
ferred f rom one situation to another and transmitted f rom one generation 
to another. External objects as carriers of memory play a role already on 
the level of personal memory. Our memory, which we possess as beings 
equipped with a human mind, exists only in constant interaction not only 
with other human memories but also with "things," outward symbols. 
With respect to things such as Marcel Proust 's famous madeleine, or arti­
facts, objects, anniversaries, feasts, icons, symbols, or landscapes, the term 
"memory" is not a metaphor but a metonym based on material contact be­
tween a remembering mind and a reminding object. Things do not "have" 
a memory of their own, but they may remind us, may trigger our memory, 
because they carry memories which we have invested into them, things 
such as dishes, feasts, rites, images, stories and other texts, landscapes, and 
other "lieux de memoire." O n the social level, with respect to groups and 
societies, the role of external symbols becomes even more important, 
because groups which, of course, do not "have" a memory tend to 
"make" themselves one by means of things meant as reminders such as 
monuments , museums, libraries, archives, and other mnemonic institu­
tions. This is what we call cultural memory (A. Assmann). In order to be 
able to be reembodied in the sequence of generations, cultural memory, 
unlike communicative memory, exists also in disembodied form and re­
quires institutions of preservation and reembodiment. 
This institutional character does not apply to what Halbwachs called 
collective memory and what we propose to rename communicative mem­
ory. Communicative memory is non­institutional; it is not supported by 
any institutions of learning, transmission, and interpretation; it is not culti­
vated by specialists and is not summoned or celebrated on special occa­
sions; it is not formalized and stabilized by any forms of material symboli­
zation; it lives in everyday interaction and communication and, for this 
very reason, has only a limited time depth which normally reaches no 
farther back than eighty years, the time span of three interacting genera­
tions. Still, there are frames, "communicative genres," traditions of com­
munication and thematization and, above all, the affective ties that bind 
together families, groups, and generations. 
A change of frames brings about forgetting; the durability of memo­
ries depends on the durability of social bonds and frames. In his earlier 
work, Halbwachs does not seem to be concerned with the social interests 
and power structures that are active in shaping and framing individual 
memories. In his last work on collective memory, however, he shows a 
keen awareness of institution and power. 1M topographic legendaire des evangiles 
en terre sainte, published in 1941 during the German occupation, deals with 
the transformation of Palestine into a site of Christian memory by the 
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installment of all kinds of memorials, a process which took place after the 
adoption of Christianity as the state religion by the Roman empire. In this 
work, he crosses the border which he himself had erected between memoire 
and tradition and shows to what degree this kind of official memory is 
dependent on theological dogma and formed by the power structure of 
the church. 
3. Time Frames 
Jan Vansina, an anthropologist who worked with oral societies in Africa, 
devoted an important study to the form in which they represent the past 
and observed a tripartite structure. The recent past, which looms large in 
interactive communication, recedes, as time goes by, more and more into 
the background. Information becomes scarcer and vaguer the further back 
one moves into the past. According to Vansina, this knowledge of affairs 
that are told and discussed in everyday communication has a limited depth 
in time, reaching not beyond three generations. Concerning a more re­
mote past, there is either a total lack of information or one or two names 
are produced with great hesitation. For the most remote past, however, 
there is again a profusion of information dealing with traditions about the 
origin of the world and the early history of the tribe. This information, 
however, is not committed to everyday communication but intensely for­
malized and institutionalized. It exists in the forms of narratives, songs, 
dances, rituals, masks, and symbols; specialists such as narrators, bards, 
mask­carvers, and others are organized in guilds and have to undergo long 
periods of initiation, instruction, and examination. Moreover, it requires 
for its actualization certain occasions when the community comes to­
gether for a celebration. This is what we propose calling "cultural mem­
ory." In oral societies, as Vansina has shown, there is a gap between the 
informal generational memory referring to the recent past and the formal 
cultural memory which refers to the remote past, the origin of the world, 
and the history of the tribe, and since this gap shifts with the succession 
of generations, Vansina calls it the "floating gap." Historical conscious­
ness, Vansina resumes, operates in oral societies on only two levels: the 
time of origins and the recent past. 
Vansina's "floating gap" illustrates the difference between social and 
cultural frames of memory or communicative and cultural memory. The 
communicative memory contains memories referring to Vansina's "recent 
past." These are the memories that an individual shares with his contem­
poraries. This is what Halbwachs understood by "collective memory" and 
what forms the object of oral history, that branch of historical research 
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that bases itself not on the usual written sources of historiography, but 
exclusively on memories gained in oral interviews. All studies in oral his­
tory confirm that even in literate societies living memory goes no further 
back than eighty years after which, separated by the floating gap, come, 
instead of myths of origin, the dates f rom schoolbooks and monuments . 
The cultural memory is based on fixed points in the past. Even in the 
cultural memory, the past is not preserved as such but is cast in symbols 
as they are represented in oral myths or in writings, performed in feasts, 
and as they are continually illuminating a changing present. In the context 
of cultural memory, the distinction between myth and history vanishes. 
N o t the past as such, as it is investigated and reconstructed by archaeolo­
gists and historians, counts for the cultural memory, but only the past as it 
is remembered. Here, in the context of cultural memory, it is the temporal 
horizon of cultural memory which is important. Cultural memory reaches 
back into the past only so far as the past can be reclaimed as "ours." This 
is why we refer to this form of historical consciousness as "memory" and 
not just as knowledge about the past. Knowledge about the past acquires 
the properties and functions of memory if it is related to a concept of 
identity. While knowledge has no form and is endlessly progressive, mem­
ory involves forgetting. It is only by forgetting what lies outside the hori­
zon of the relevant that it performs an identity function. Nietzsche (The 
Use and Abuse of History) circumscribed this function by notions such as 
"plastic power" and "horizon," obviously intending the same thing for 
which now the term "identity" has become generally accepted. 
Whereas knowledge has a universalist perspective, a tendency towards 
generalization and standardization, memory, even cultural memory, is 
local, egocentric, and specific to a group and its values. 
4. Identity 
The distinction of different forms of memory looks like a structure but it 
works more as a dynamic, creating tension and transition between the 
various poles. There is also much overlapping. This holds true especially 
with respect to the relation between memory and identity. We must cer­
tainly avoid falling victim to what Amartya Sen has described as the 
"identity illusion." Individuals possess various identities according to the 
various groups, communities, belief systems, political systems, etc. to 
which they belong, and equally multifarious are their communicative and 
cultural, in short: collective memories. O n all levels, memory is an open 
system. Still, it is not totally open and diffuse; there are always frames that 
relate memory to specific horizons of time and identity on the individual, 
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generational, political, and cultural levels. Where this relation is absent, we 
are not dealing with memory but with knowledge. Memory is knowledge 
with an identity-index, it is knowledge about oneself, that is, one's own 
diachronic identity, be it as an individual or as a member of a family, a 
generation, a community, a nation, or a cultural and religious tradition. 
Groups are formed and cohere by the dynamics of association and 
dissociation which is always loaded (to varying degrees) with affection. 
Halbwachs, therefore, spoke of "communautes affectives." These "affective 
ties" lend memories their special intensity. Remembering is a realization of 
belonging, even a social obligation. O n e has to remember in order to be­
long: This is also one of the most important insights in Nietzsche's Geneal­
ogy of Morality. Assimilation, the transition of one group into another one, 
is usually accompanied by an imperative to forget the memories con­
nected with the original identity. Inversely, this kind of assimilatory for­
getting is precisely what is most feared and prohibited in the book of 
Deuteronomy, which deals with such a change of frame between Egypt 
and Canaan and the first and second generations of emigrants f rom 
Egypt. 
5. Institutions and Carriers 
The difference between communicative and cultural memory expresses 
itself also in the social dimension, in the structure of participation. The 
participation of a group in communicative memory is diffuse. Some, it is 
true, know more, some less, and the memories of the old reach farther 
back than those of the young. However, there are no specialists of infor­
mal, communicative memory. The knowledge which is communicated in 
everyday interaction has been acquired by the participants along with lan­
guage and social competence. The participation of a group in cultural 
memory, by contrast, is always highly differentiated. This applies even and 
especially to oral and egalitarian societies. The preservation of the cultural 
memory of the group was originally the task of the poets. Even today, the 
African griots fulfill this function of guardians of cultural memory. 
The cultural memory always has its specialists, bo th in oral and in lit­
erate societies. These include shamans, bards, and griots, as well as priests, 
teachers, artists, clerks, scholars, mandarins, rabbis, mullahs, and other 
names for specialized carriers of memory. In oral societies, the degree of 
specialization of these carriers depends on the magnitude of the demands 
that are made of their memory. Those demands that insist on verbatim 
transmission are ranked highest. Here, human memory is used as a "data­
base" in a sense approaching the use of writing: A fixed text is verbally 
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"written" into the highly specialized and trained memory of these special­
ists. This is typically the case when ritual knowledge is at stake and where 
a ritual must strictly follow a "script," even if this script is not laid down in 
wridng. The Rgveda constitutes the most prominent example of a codifi­
cation of ritual memory based solely on oral tradition. The magnitude of 
this task corresponds to the social rank of the ritual specialists, the Brah­
min, who form the highest caste, higher even than the aristocratic class of 
warriors (Kshatriya) to which the rulers belong. In traditional Rwanda, the 
scripts for the eighteen royal rituals had to be memorized by specialists 
who ranked as the highest notables of the kingdom. Error could be pun­
ished by death. Those three notables who knew by heart the full text of all 
eighteen rituals even partook of the divinity of the ruler (Borgeaud). 
In the context of rituals, therefore, we observe the rise of the oldest 
systems of memorization or mnemotechniques, with or without the help 
of systems of notation like knotted chords, tchuringas, and other forms of 
pre­writing. With the invention of full­fledged systems of writing, it is 
interesting to see how differently various religions have behaved vis a vis 
this new cultural technique. In the Indo­European traditions, from the 
Indian Brahmins to the Celtic Druids, we observe a general distrust and 
shunning of writing. Memory is held to be by far the more trustworthy 
medium to hand down the religious (that is, ritual) knowledge to later 
generations. The reason normally given is that too many mistakes may 
creep into a text by copying. The true reason, however, seems to be that 
writing always implies the danger of dissemination, of giving away a secret 
tradition to the profane and uninitiated. This distrust in writing is still very 
prominent in Plato. In the ancient Near Eastern societies such as Meso­
potamia, Israel, and Egypt, on the other hand, writing is eagerly grasped as 
an ideal medium for codifying and transmitting the sacred traditions, es­
pecially ritual scripts and recitations. 
But even where the sacred tradition is committed to writing, memori­
zation plays the central role. In ancient Egypt, a typical temple library 
contained no more books than may be known by heart by the specialists. 
Clement of Alexandria gives a vivid description of such a library. He 
speaks of forty­two "indispensable" or "absolutely necessary" ipany 
anankaiai) books that formed the stock of an Egyptian temple library and 
were all written by Thot­Hermes himself. The priests were not supposed 
to read and learn all of the books, but to specialize in certain genres corre­
sponding to their rank and office. In describing a procession of these 
priests, Clement shows both the hierarchy of the priesthood and the 
structure of their library (Stromateis 6.4.35­37). The highest ranks are held 
by the stolistes and the prophetes, corresponding in Egyptian terminology to 
the "lector priest" and the "high priest." It is the books of the stolist that 
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serve as a codification of ritual memory proper, complemented by what 
Clement calls "education." The books of the high priest, on the other 
hand, are said to contain normative or legal literature concerning the laws, 
the gods, and priestly education. The library, thus, is divided into norma­
tive knowledge, which ranks highest; ritual knowledge, which comes a 
close second; and general knowledge concerning astronomy, geography, 
poetry, biography, and medicine, which occupies the lowest rank among 
this canon of highly indispensable literature. 
There is, however, still another sense in which the participation in 
cultural memory may be structured in a society. This concerns the ques­
tion of restricted knowledge, of secrecy and esotericism. Every traditional 
society knows areas of restricted knowledge whose boundaries are not 
simply defined by the different capacities of human memory and under­
standing, but also by questions of access and initiation. In Judaism, for 
example, general participation is required in the Torah which every (male) 
member of the group is supposed to know by heart. Specialized participa­
tion concerns the world of Talmudic and Medieval commentaries, codices, 
and midrash, a vast body of literature that only specialists can master. 
Secrecy, however, shrouds the esoteric world of kabbala, to which only 
select adepts (and only after they have reached the age of forty) are ad­
mitted. 
The participation structure of cultural memory has an inherent tendency 
to elitism; it is never strictly egalitarian. Some are almost forced into 
participation and have to prove their degree of admittance by formal exams 
(as in traditional China); or by the mastery of linguistic registers (as in 
England); or of the "Citatenschat^ des deutschen Volkef (treasury of German 
quotations) as in nineteenth­century Germany. Others remain systematically 
excluded from this "distinguished" knowledge, such as women in ancient 
Greece, traditional China, and orthodox Judaism, or the lower classes in the 
heyday of the German Bildungsburgertum (educated bourgeoisie). 
As to the media of cultural memory, a more or less pronounced ten­
dency can be discerned towards a form of intra­cultural diglossia, corre­
sponding to the distinction between one "great tradition" and several 
"little traditions" as proposed by Robert Redfield. Until the creation of 
modern Iwrith, the Jews had always lived in a situation of diglossia, since 
their "Great Tradition" was written in Hebrew and for their everyday 
communication they used vernacular languages such as Yiddish, Ladino, 
or the various languages of their host countries. To a similar or lesser 
degree, this situation is typical of virtually all traditional societies, be it in 
the form of two different languages, such as Hindu and Sanskrit or Italian 
and Latin, or two different linguistic varieties, such as Qur'anic and ver­
nacular Arabic or classical and modern Chinese. Modern societies tend to 
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diversify this binary structure by introducing more linguistic varieties ac­
cording to the multiplication of cultural media such as film, broadcasting, 
and television. The following list with its clear­cut binary structure, there­
fore, does not do full justice to the modern situation: 
Communicative 
Memory 
Cultural Memory 
Content history in the frame of 
autobiographical memory, 
recent past 
mythical history, 
events in absolute 
past ("in illo 
tempore") 
Forms informal traditions and 
genres of everyday 
communication 
high degree of 
formation, 
ceremonial 
communication; 
Media living, embodied memory, 
communication in 
vernacular language 
mediated in texts, 
icons, dances, rituals, 
and performances of 
various kinds; 
"classical" or oth­
erwise formalized 
language(s) 
Time 
Structure 
80­100 years, a moving 
horizon of 3­4 interacting 
generations 
absolute past, 
mythical primordial 
time, "3000 years" 
Participation 
Structure 
diffuse specialized carriers of 
memory, 
hierarchically 
structured 
Figure 2 
Transitions and transformations account for the dynamics of cultural 
memory. Two typical directions have a structural significance and should 
at least briefly be mentioned in this context. One concerns the transition 
from autobiographical and communicative memory into cultural memory, 
and the other concerns, within cultural memory, the move from the rear 
stage to the forefront, from the periphery into the center, from latency or 
potentiality to manifestation or actualization and vice versa. These shifts 
presuppose structural boundaries which are to be crossed: the boundary 
between embodied and mediated forms of memory, and the boundary 
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between what we propose calling "working" and "reference memories" or 
"canon" and "archive" (see also A. Assmann, this volume). 
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